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IMMIGRATION LAW—MIXED FEELINGS ON MIXED PETITIONS TO
REOPEN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: THE NECESSITY BEHIND REQUIRING A
TEST TO DETERMINE APPLICABILITY OF THE CHANGED COUNTRY
CONDITIONS EXCEPTION
Matthew Minniefield*
The Federal Courts of Appeals have created a circuit split regarding
“mixed petitions” to reopen removal proceedings. Mixed petitions,
those brought under both a change in the petitioner’s personal
circumstances and a change in the country conditions of the country
of removal, need to be allowed in specific, but not all, situations.
The upward trend in quantity of removal proceedings over the past
decade and beyond has created a surge of removal proceedings that
even a properly trained and funded set of immigration courts would
have difficulty handling. The immigration courts in the United States
are both under-funded and oftentimes under-qualified to properly
adjudicate the decisions.
When a petitioner brings an appeal to the appropriate Federal Court
of Appeals, one hopes the final resolution would exemplify fair and
uniform application of the particular statute. Instead, the Federal
Courts of Appeals have created a split that leaves practitioners,
aliens, and even immigration judges and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) in the dark as to whether they should hear mixed
petitions to reopen removal proceedings.
A test that removes some of the discretion from the immigration judge
and provides the immigration judges and immigration courts with a
definite and succinct set of rules when a mixed petition can be brought
will remove part of the injustice recently created by the immigration
courts.

INTRODUCTION
Li Zhang, a citizen of China, was attempting to remain in the United
States even though she had already been ordered removed by both an
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2017. I would
like to thank Professors Arthur Wolf and Pat Newcombe for their tireless assistance in the
drafting phase of this Note. I am also thankful for the entire Western New England Law Review
staff for their thoughtful edits. To my family, thanks for always pushing me to learn new things.
To my wife, Alexis, you are the reason this process has not aged me a day and for that I am
most thankful.
69

70

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:069

immigration judge and the BIA in June of 2004.1 After her removal
proceedings, she remained in the United States for seven years.2 During
this time, Li Zhang had converted her faith to Catholicism because her
husband (who himself fled China for fear of persecution after attending an
underground church) was Catholic; she was baptized on December 25,
2011, and both of her children were also baptized.3 She and her family
attended a Catholic church habitually.4 Zhang’s husband had his removal
withheld; she, however, was not as fortunate.5
While Zhang admitted her petition to reopen her removal
proceedings was clearly both time- and number-barred by the applicable
statute, she attempted to persuade the court to allow her to utilize the
related exception found in the same statute.6 The court, however, found
her claims “rest[ed] primarily on a change in personal circumstances . . .
and, accordingly, [the BIA] correctly denied her motion to reopen as timeand number-barred.”7
Cipto Chandra faced a similar situation to Li Zhang’s; namely, he
untimely moved the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings based on
persecution he would face for being a Christian.8 Strikingly similar to Li
Zhang, Chandra did not become a Christian until after his removal
proceedings concluded.9 At first, Chandra’s outcome was similar to Li
Zhang’s—the BIA denied the motion to reopen.10 Chandra did not meet
the time limitation and the BIA determined the changes to Chandra’s
personal circumstances could not give rise to a change in country
conditions as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act.11 The
conclusion of the case is where Chandra’s differs from Li Zhang’s.12
1. For the facts pertinent to this portion of the introduction, see Li Zhang v. Att’y Gen.
of the United States, 543 F. App’x. 277 (3rd Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 278.
3. Id. at 279.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 279–80 (“[Li Zhang’s] husband was granted withholding of removal . . .
although the record in this case does not reflect the reasons behind the decision in his case.”).
6. Id. at 281. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 240(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii) (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2016).
7. Li Zhang, 543 F. App’x at 281.
8. For the facts pertinent to the second portion of the introduction, see Chandra v. Holder,
751 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2014).
9. Id. at 1035. Chandra was ordered removed in 2001, had his asylum petition denied in
2002, had his appeal dismissed by the BIA in 2003, and had his petition for review denied by
the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in 2005. However, he remained in the country,
converted to Christianity, and attended church regularly. Id.
10. Id. at 1036.
11. Id. at 1036; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) (2016); Immigration and
Nationality Act §§ 240(c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii) (2016).
12. Chandra, 751 F.3d at 1036.
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Chandra won his appeal, with the court “hold[ing] that a petitioner’s
untimely motion to reopen may qualify under the changed conditions
exception in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), even if the changed country
conditions are made relevant by a change in the petitioner’s personal
circumstances.”13 This decision, allowing a mixed petition to reopen
removal proceedings under the statutory exemption offered for changed
country conditions, opened the door for analysis into what circumstances
should lead to allowing a mixed petition.
Unfortunately, there is consistent criticism of immigration
adjudication.14 Beyond the reported bias and prejudice,15 inconsistencies
for grant rates in asylum decisions both between immigration courts and
among immigration judges in the same courtroom have become
unmistakably apparent.16 Studies of immigration adjudication found,
outrageously, that an asylum applicant’s chances of being free from
persecution relied on “a spin of the wheel of chance,” where results
differed based on the immigration judges or asylum officers assigned to
each case.17 For any system of American jurisprudence to fall prey to bias
or unfair reasoning would be a “crisis,” but this criticism is especially
concerning in immigration law, which has such a grand effect on an
individual’s life.18 Adding to this crisis are situations where the Federal
Courts of Appeals, which are already overwhelmed by appeals from
decisions of immigration courts and the BIA,19 cannot reach a consensus
on a matter such as whether mixed petitions are allowed to be brought
under the changed country conditions exception.20 Compounding this,
immigration judges have consistently been overworked for the past

13. Id. at 1038.
14. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.
15. Id. See also Ann M. Simmons, U.S. Is Reviewing Behavior of Immigration Judges,
BALT. SUN
(Feb.
12,
2006),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-02-12/news/
0602120159_1_judges-appellate-courts-attorney-general.
16. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296, 332 (2007) (analyzing data from the immigration courts, the BIA,
and the Courts of Appeals, and finding disparate decisions among them).
17. Id. at 378.
18. Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73
BROOKLYN L. REV. 467, 470 (2008).
19. See, e.g., John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (2006–
07); Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing out at the BIA and
Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to Blame?, 82 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2005,
2005–07 (Dec. 19, 2005).
20. See Rei Feng Wang v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 283 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding the First Circuit
need not take a position on the current circuit split regarding mixed petitions since it could make
its determination on other grounds).
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decade, and only recently has the United States government taken steps to
correct this.21
In essence, there is an area of law that affects an extremely large
number of people, carries a potential punishment that is as strict as a noncitizen may face, and is adjudicated by judges who are notoriously biased
and unfair, with rules on which the Federal Courts of Appeals cannot
agree. To say there is an issue to be addressed and fixed is an
understatement.
This Note will first discuss the background of immigration
proceedings generally, since the need for a test for mixed petitions stems
not only from the current split among the Federal Courts of Appeals, but
also from the underlying issues in the immigration courts. This Note will
further address the organizations, people, and actual process of the
proceedings involved. Then, this Note will detail some of the specific
requirements of motions to reopen removal proceedings.
Next, this Note will shift its focus to the current landscape of
immigration proceedings. It is apparent through this lens that immigration
reform, such as Operation Streamline, has created a surge in the number
of cases improperly decided by the immigration courts and thus appealed
to the Federal Courts. Once in the Federal Courts, these cases are often
overturned, thus leading to splits such as the one regarding mixed petitions
to reopen removal proceedings.
This Note next investigates the means by which some discretion can
be removed from the immigration courts, concluding that a test is required
to resolve the current circuit split. The next section of this Note
determines this test would be better suited with rules over standards.
Lastly, this Note proposes an employable test the immigration courts and
the BIA should apply in determining whether to consider mixed petitions
to reopen removal proceedings under the changed country conditions
exception to the ninety-day statutory limit.
I.

A GUIDE TO REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

Before embarking on a discussion of flaws in the immigration
system,22 including mixed petitions themselves, one must grasp the basics
21. See Mark Noferi, Bi-Partisan House Bill Recommends Largest Increase Ever in
Immigration Judges, IMMIGR. IMPACT (May 21, 2015), http://immigrationimpact.com
/2015/05/21/bi-partisan-house-bill-recommends-largest-increase-ever-in-immigration-judges/
(“Each immigration judge was handling over 1,400 ‘matters’ a year on average at the end of FY
2014 . . . The resulting backlog—which has increased 163% since 2003—has led to average
hearing delays of over a year-and-a-half . . . .”).
22. For the purposes of this Note immigration reform will focus on motions to reopen
removal proceedings. Frankly, a Note addressing every area of immigration law ripe for reform
would be an encyclopedia. See LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring
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of immigration enforcement and the procedures that the administrative
bodies in charge of enforcement must follow. In exploring these
procedures, this Note advances the principal theme that the procedural
aspect of immigration law is flawed and needs to be reformed.
A. The Organizations Involved
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)23 and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) share the enforcement of immigration and
naturalization laws.24 The DHS is further broken down into various
subdivisions to handle enforcement.25 Lawful immigration, for example,
is handled through the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services.26 Other divisions of the DHS are in charge of enforcement
regarding aliens who are removable or inadmissible.27 The Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division of the DHS contains agents,
officers, and attorneys who act as the police and prosecutor for the
government with respect to aliens that are alleged to be subject to
removal.28
The Executive Branch handles the immigration judges, their
courtrooms, and the proceedings regarding removal and other
immigration matters.29 Since immigration proceedings involve matters of
foreign relations, the pronouncement of whether to allow or inhibit an
individual to immigrate is more appropriately left to the Executive than
the Judiciary.30 Adjudication for disputed removal proceedings is handled
through the DOJ.31 Within the DOJ, the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) handles immigration matters.32 “Specifically, under
delegated authority from the Attorney General, EOIR interprets and

Competent Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 123, 137–38 (noting
there is a general accord as to the nature of United States immigration system being broken and
in need of serious reform).
23. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2016) (outlining
the authority and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security).
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2016) (outlining
the authority and responsibilities of the Department of Justice).
25. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2016).
26. What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus/what-we-do (last updated July 14, 2015).
27. See infra, Part I.C. regarding what determines removability and inadmissibility.
28. What We Do, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
overview (last visited October 24, 2015).
29. Benedetto, supra note 18, at 473.
30. Id. at 471.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2016).
32. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2007) (establishing the EOIR as the division within the DOJ
to handle immigration matters).
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administers federal immigration laws by conducting immigration court
proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.”33 More than
235 immigration judges conduct administrative proceedings in fifty-eight
immigration courts functioning within the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge (“OCIJ”), a component of the EOIR that hears cases including
removal proceedings.34
The BIA, an appellate component to the EOIR, handles appeals from
decisions of the immigration judges.35 The BIA is the highest
administrative tribunal regarding immigration law in the nation, and
certain cases decided by the BIA are precedential.36 If individuals intend
to seek review of a decision by the BIA, they may do so in a federal
court.37 Finally, the BIA also has the authority to discipline immigration
attorneys within administrative proceedings.38 A third component of the
EOIR, the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
(“OCAHO”), hears non-removal proceedings like those that involve
“illegal hiring of unauthorized workers, document fraud, and unfair
immigration-related employment practices.”39
The OCIJ also controls a self-auditing process to ensure proper
procedure by immigration judges.40 A complaint against an immigration
judge can be initiated in two ways: it may be initiated by an individual or
group filing a written or oral complaint, or the OCIJ may itself become
aware of information warranting discipline via referrals from other
components of the agency, internal reviews, or news releases.41 Discipline
ranges from as little as a reprimand to as severe as removal from federal
service.42 Corrective actions are generally imposed progressively,
beginning with the least severe first and increasing toward more severe
discipline if a problem persists.43 If a problem is severe in the first

33. Organization, Mission and Functions Manual, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-executive-officeimmigration-review#content (signed by Eric H. Holder, Jr. May 16, 2013).
34. EOIR at a Glance, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirat-a-glance.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (2011).
39. EOIR at a Glance, supra note 34.
40. Summary of OCIJ Procedure for Handling Complaints Against Immigration Judges,
DEP’T OF JUST. (May 17, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/
legacy/2013/05/23/IJComplaintProcess.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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instance, a serious disciplinary action may be warranted.44 The official
deciding whether discipline is warranted (typically the Deputy Chief
Immigration Judge) will consult the factors listed in Douglas v. Veteran’s
Administration,45 which include
the nature and seriousness of the conduct, the immigration judge’s
length of service and past disciplinary record, mitigating
circumstances, the likelihood of repeat occurrence absent action by the
Agency, the impact of the offense on the reputation of the agency, and
the consistency of the penalty with similar instances of misconduct.46

While the EOIR works toward efficient and fair administration of
justice,47 immigration judges have long been criticized for their biased and
inappropriate handling of cases.48
B. The People Involved
During the 1980s, the initial years of the EOIR, the appointed
immigration judges all fit the same model: white males between 40-60
years of age, typically a former employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) in a prosecutorial capacity (though
currently, immigration judges fit a more diverse background).49 The
Attorney General appoints immigration judges subject to the supervision
and control of the Attorney General.50 Previously, the EOIR assessed
candidates for the position and forwarded its approvals to the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General for final approval that occurred almost
regularly.51
Recently, the trend has reversed itself: the Attorney General will

44. Id.
45. 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (MSPB 1981).
46. Summary of OCIJ Procedure for Handling Complaints Against Immigration Judges,
supra note 40.
47.
See Fiscal Years 2008-2013 Strategic Plan, DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 2008)
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/01/23/EOIR%20Strategic%20Plan
%202008-2013%20Final.pdf (stating one of the goals of the EOIR, aside from the prevention
of crime and terrorism, is to promote justice through impartial and prompt adjudication). This
goal is so important, it is considered the “foundation for th[e] agency’s strategic planning
effort.” Id.
48. See Simmons, supra note 15 (expressing a concern with the actions of immigration
judges ranging from relying on expert testimony from an individual who didn’t speak the
language a document was written in to a judge calling himself “Tarzan” in a case wherein a
Ugandan woman who was raped was named “Jane”).
49. Benedetto, supra note 18, at 472.
50. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2016).
51. Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships Political,
LEGAL TIMES (May 28, 2007), http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/70836-doj-madeimmigration-judgeships-political.
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handpick an individual, and the EOIR will refrain from objecting to the
candidate, even in spite of his or her lack of any experience or background
in immigration law.52 In fact, between 2004 and 2007, a report found that
half of the immigration judges selected had no previous experience in
immigration law.53 This process differs from judge selection in other
areas of the law, such as federal judges, state judges, or even
administrative law judges.54 Federal judges are first nominated by the
President and then undergo other inquiries before confirmation in the
Senate.55 State judges are either appointed or elected depending on statespecific structures.56 Administrative law judges are selected by the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management and must meet certain criteria, like
seven years of litigation or trial experience, as well as pass an
administrative law judge examination.57 Competency on the immigration
bench is naturally important. The number of competent immigration
judges serving in the immigration courts is even more important
considering the fact that an “[immigration judge] often makes the ultimate
determination of an immigrant’s fate.”58
C. The Process and Proceedings Involved
Removal proceedings in the United States are quite complex.59
Under federal law, an immigration judge is the first decision maker in
ruling whether a non-citizen is removable.60 “Removability,” as it has
been coined, is a determination of whether or not the government is within
its legal bounds in excluding or deporting a non-citizen or “alien.”61 An
alien, for purposes of removal proceedings, is an individual who is not a
citizen of the United States. Whether the person is in the United States
legally or illegally is not of consequence to the phrase.62

52. Id.
53. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties,
WASH. POST, June 11, 2007.
54. Benedetto, supra note 18, at 472.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 473.
57. Id. at 477–78.
58. Id. at 475.
59. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1813 (2013).
60. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2016) (“An
immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability
of an alien.”).
61. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(e)(2) (2016)
(providing the definition for “removable”).
62. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2016).
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Removal Proceedings

The issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) initiates a removal
proceeding.63 An NTA provides the alien with the nature of the
proceeding, the legal authority the government has to bring the
proceedings, the acts that caused the initiation of the proceeding, as well
as contact information requests, and the date and time of the proceeding.64
Over forty different employment positions within the DHS may issue
NTAs.65 Filing of the charging document (which includes an NTA) with
an immigration court commences the case and the immigration court
retains jurisdiction over the proceeding.66
The first appearance for a respondent in front of the immigration
judge is for a Master Calendar Hearing.67 This hearing provides
respondents with knowledge of their right to an attorney (at no expense to
the government).68 During the Master Calendar Hearing, other hearings
are scheduled to determine the merits of the case, take pleadings, and
determine the destination country should the alien be determined
removable, among other things.69
Next, a respondent needs to attend an individual calendar hearing,
which is an evidentiary hearing on the merits of contested matters such as
applications from relief of removability.70 An evidentiary hearing is held
before the immigration judge wherein the judge has full discretion to
conclude whether the respondent is removable.71
An alien is removable based on a violation of one of two sections:
inadmissible aliens under Section 212 of Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1182,72 or deportable aliens under Section 237 of Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227.73 While both aliens who are
“deportable” and aliens who are “inadmissible” may face removal

63. Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2016).
64. Id.
65. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2016).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2016).
67. Immigration Court Practice Manual, DEP’T OF JUST. at 67 (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2015/05/20/practice_manual_revi
ew.pdf.
68. Id. at 67–68.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 79.
71. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369, 371–72 (2006).
72. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2016).
73. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2016). See Koh, supra
note 59, at 1814 (clarifying the distinction between aliens being removable because of
deportation or inadmissibility).
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proceedings, the procedures may differ.74 Deportable aliens are those who
are already in the United States as unauthorized immigrants.75
Inadmissible aliens are those who are attempting to enter the United States
and are deemed inadmissible.76 Both deportable and inadmissible aliens
may face removal proceedings to order the alien to leave the country.77
Statistically, the number of removable aliens in the United States is
distributed evenly between the two groups.78 Besides, removability
(whether based on deportation or inadmissibility), while seemingly
discretionary based on the level of scrutiny applied by immigration
judges, is in reality a legal question since “incorrect removability
determinations may lead to the execution of removal orders that lack a
legal basis altogether.”79 Contesting removability, whether by moving to
reopen removal proceedings or otherwise, remains one of the most
important processes any alien will face.
The burden of proof for removability depends on whether the
respondent is being characterized as inadmissible or deportable.80 For
aliens who are in removal proceedings as being inadmissible, the burden
falls on the alien to show, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien
is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission.”81
The government carries the burden in cases of deportability, where “the
[U.S. Citizenship and Immigration] Service has the burden of establishing

74. See Koh, supra note 59, at 1814–15; Richard Frankel, Illegal Emigration: The
Continuing Life of Invalid Deportation Orders, 65 SMU L. REV. 503, 507 (2012).
75. Koh, supra note 59, at 1814–15.
76. Id. “Admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2016).
77. Koh, supra note 59, at 1814–15.
78. See Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW RES. CTR. (May
22, 2006), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/05/22/modes-of-entry-for-the-unauthorizedmigrant-population/ (showing that in 2006 approximately 45% of undocumented immigrants
were individuals that entered the United States legally and overstayed their visa); but see Jens
M. Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/24/5-facts-about-illegalimmigration-in-the-u-s/ (showing that the unauthorized immigrant population in the United
States was increasing until 2007 when it leveled off, which demonstrates the statistics from the
2006 study may no longer be relevant).
79. Koh, supra note 59, at 1818. See also Frankel, supra note 74 (addressing the issue
of more than one thousand deportation decisions overturned each year by the federal circuit
courts, and the subsequent ramifications the now external aliens face).
80. Cf. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B)
(2016) (explaining when the alien carries the burden); Immigration and Nationality Act §
240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2016) (explaining when the government carries the
burden).
81. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2016).
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by clear and convincing evidence . . . the alien is deportable.”82 The
proceeding concludes with an immigration judge determining whether the
alien is removable.83 Following a determination of removability, the
immigration judge must determine whether the alien may move to remain
in the country via other means of discretionary relief.84 This evidentiary
hearing, though not the final hearing to which an applicant is entitled,
carries the utmost importance for certain individuals as it is the only time
an applicant can present evidence for his or her claim for relief.85 If, after
this first step, it is determined that the respondent is not inadmissible or
deportable, the removal proceedings end and the respondent legally
remains in the United States.86
If the respondent or alien is determined to be inadmissible or
deportable, the second step is for the immigration judge to decide if the
alien is qualified to remain in the United States under some form of
discretionary relief.87 The factual circumstances of the respondent are the
weightiest evidence for the immigration judge at this point.88
Aliens who fear persecution if they are removed to the country that
was designated during the Master Calendar Hearing generally have three
options for discretionary relief from the removal proceeding: asylum,89
withholding of removal,90 and relief pursuant to the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).91 Any alien, irrespective of status, may apply for
asylum.92 The asylum applicant carries the burden to show that such an
individual is within a particular “race, religion, nationality, [has]
membership in a particular social group, or [has a] political opinion [that]
was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”93
Although an asylum application may be denied, if granted it provides
the applicant with the enormous possibility of becoming a Lawful

82. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2016).
83. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2016).
84. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2016).
85. See Ramji-Nogales, et al., supra note 16, at 326 (“For [individuals that raise an
asylum claim after being placed in removal proceedings], the immigration court hearing is the
only opportunity they will have to present evidence in support of their case.”).
86. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1) (2016).
87. Legomsky, supra note 71, at 371–72.
88. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2016)
(requiring the alien to meet the burden necessary and sustain credibility).
89. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2016).
90. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2016); see also 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (2000).
91. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2000).
92. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2016).
93. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)
(2016).
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Permanent Resident (“LPR”) of the United States.94 There are four
necessities to being granted asylum. First, an applicant must prove he or
she is a refugee within the meaning of Section 208 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A),95 which means the applicant
must show persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution in the
country from which they came.96 Next, the applicant’s fear of persecution
must be related to one of the five statutorily defined grounds: race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.97 Third, the alien must “demonstrate[] by clear and convincing
evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of
the alien’s arrival in the United States.”98 Finally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General retain discretion of whether
to grant asylum.99 If the applicant can prove that they will be tortured if a
removal is not withheld, they may remain in the United States under CAT
relief.100
Another discretionary form of relief an alien may seek, when he or
she does not meet the above threshold, is under a cancellation of a removal
order.101 Being ordered removed does not preempt an alien from
continuing to attempt to cancel removal.102 Permanent residents and nonpermanent residents face different requirements for this form of relief.103
As with most areas of immigration law, an applicant for cancellation of a
removal order must also pass the immigration judge’s discretionary

94. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 209(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(2) (2016) (stating
that an applicant who was granted permission to remain in the United States via asylum, and
has remained in the United States for one year will be examined by the DHS, and if found to be
admissible, will be granted Lawful Permanent Resident Status).
95. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)
(2016).
96. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2016).
97. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)
(2016).
98. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2016).
99. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)
(2016) (using language that the entities involved “may grant asylum” (emphasis added).
100. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2000); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 (2000) (providing the
definition of torture and the application process).
101. Discretionary since the statute articulates that the Attorney General may provide the
relief. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2016).
102. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 n.8 (2010).
103. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(a)–(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b)
(2016) (requiring permanent residents be lawfully admitted for not less than five years, resided
in the United States for seven continuous years after admittance, and not have been convicted
of an aggravated felony; while non-permanent residents must have resided in the United States
continuously for not less than ten years, be a person of good moral character, not been convicted
of statutorily defined offenses, and “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a citizen or LPR “spouse, parent, or child” of the applicant).
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judgment.104 An alien who does not meet these forms of discretionary
relief, and is removable, may not remain in the United States.105 Indeed,
certain aliens face expedited proceedings for committing aggravated
felonies,106 and aliens who have been ordered removed and then illegally
reenter the United States will have their previous removal order reinstated
without the possibility of reopening or reviewing the previous removal
order.107 However, aliens who have been ordered removed via regular
removal proceedings and have not violated this removal order by
reentering the United States, such as motions to reconsider and motions to
reopen the removal proceedings.108
2.

Recourse after the Conclusion of Removal Proceedings

After the issuance of a final administrative order, either party may
make a motion to reopen the removal proceedings based on new facts or
circumstances.109 Aliens are allowed one swing of the bat, and must do
so within a relatively short period of time, in an attempt to reopen removal
proceedings decided by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration
Appeals.110
Due to the public preference of finality to proceedings, motions to
reopen removal proceedings have long been disfavored.111 However,
wrongful removal proceedings have proved to be not only existent and
pervasive, but create a complex and oftentimes impossible road to
citizenship for the alien.112 As a result, federal courts “reverse deportation

104. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)
(2016) (requiring any applicant of relief or protection from removal to establish that they merit
a favorable exercise of discretion).
105. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2016).
106. Immigration and Nationality Act § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2016).
107. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2016).
108. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(6)–(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)–(7)
(2016).
109. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2016).
110. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i) (2016) (“An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings
under this section,” and “the motion to reopen shall be filed within ninety-days of the date of
entry of a final administrative order of removal.”).
111. See I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 US 314, 323 (1992) (stating motions to reopen are similar
to petitions to rehear a case or motions for a new trial brought under the guise of newly
discovered evidence, only worse, since “as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage
of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.”); Matter of Coelho,
20 I&N Dec. 464, 18 (BIA 1992); see also Hang Chen v. Holder, 675 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir.
2012) (“[We] disfavor motions to reopen removal proceedings because they run the risk of
frustrating ‘the compelling public interests in finality and the expeditious processing of
proceedings.’” (quoting Guerrero-Santana v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 2007))).
112. See Frankel, supra note 74.
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orders at substantially higher rates than for other appeals.”113 This
overwhelming rate of reversal is even more concerning when factored
together with the fact that 72,000 (almost half) of all federal prosecutions
are for either illegal entry or illegal re-entry, costing the United States well
over one billion dollars.114 Reopening the removal proceeding is one of
the ways aliens can ensure the immigration judge or Board of Immigration
Appeals gets the answer correct earlier, thus preventing some of the
inordinate costs associated with implementation of immigration law.
A motion to reconsider requests that the adjudicator re-examine the
earlier decision in light of a change in the law or an argument of fact or
law that the immigration judge overlooked or misconstrued.115 “A motion
to reopen is a traditional procedural mechanism in immigration law with
a basic purpose that has remained constant—to give aliens a means to
provide new information relevant to their cases to the immigration
authorities.”116 Motions to reopen removal proceedings allow an alien to
bring forth new evidence not previously available to be heard by the
immigration judge or BIA.117 On account of perceived abuses of the
system of filing motions to reopen and reconsider, Congress directed the
Attorney General to issue regulations, which proposed limitations on how
long after an order had been issued a petitioner may move to reopen or
reconsider and how many motions a petitioner may make.118 At this point,
Congress intended to limit motions to reconsider and reopen to one per
movant within a time limit of twenty days from the date of the final
determination.119 In 1996, after public comment on the matter, the
finalized regulations restricted movants to only one motion to reopen,
which must be made within ninety-days.120 Thereafter, Congress

113. Id. at 504–05.
114. Doug Keller, Re-Thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 67–
68 (2012).
115. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) (2016).
116. Meza-Vallejos v. Holder, 669 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2016). Petitioners may also bring
motions to reopen removal proceedings by bringing a new application for relief based on new
evidence that was not discoverable prior to the previous hearing, so long as such evidence is
material. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2016).
117. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2016).
118. Anne J. Greer & Teresa L. Donnovan, Immigration Law in Motion—The Changing
Landscape of Motions for Continuance, Change of Venue, Reopening, Remand, and
Reconsideration Before the Immigration Judges, Board of Immigration Appeals, and the
Federal Circuit Courts, 07-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2007) (citing Section 545(d) of the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 stat. 5066 (1990)).
119. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP.
NO. 101-955 at 133 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
120. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 83, 18900 (April 29, 1996).

2017]

MIXED FEELINGS ON MIXED PETITIONS

83

incorporated the above restrictions in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.121
Congress allows a broad range of specific exceptions to the number
and time restrictions currently on motions to reopen removal
proceedings.122 However, there is one exception that applies to all
individuals; this exception is often referred to as the changed country
conditions exception.123 Under this exception,
[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen if the basis
of the motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 or 1231(b)(3)
of this title and is based on changed country conditions arising in the
country of nationality or the county to which removal has been
ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would
not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. 124

As evidenced by the language of the statute, the changed country
conditions exception only applies in a situation happening in the country
where a person is being removed.125 The statute does not apply to changed
personal circumstances, whereby a person changes his or her own
circumstances in such a way that would lead to persecution in the country
of removal.126 The statute does not apply to changed personal
circumstances. A change solely in a person’s conditions of a person and
not in the country of removal does not lift the time limitation allowed
under reopening removal proceedings.127
A different issue appears altogether when the changes are both to
personal circumstances and to country conditions, a situation that is often
called a “mixed petition.”128 The courts of appeals are currently split in
how to proceed in situations where a petitioner brings a motion that
121. Now codified at Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(6)–(7).
122.
See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7)(C)(iv), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) (2016) (stating specific situations and instances which the time and
number bar of reopening removal proceedings will not apply including: battered spouses,
children, and parents).
123. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)
(2016).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Ming Chen v. Holder, 722 F.3d 63, 66–67 (1st Cir. 2013); Xiu Zhen Zheng
v. Holder, 548 F. App’x. 869, 870 (4th Cir. 2013); Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878, 879–
80 (6th Cir. 2012); Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 691 F.3d 488, 497–98 (3d Cir. 2012); Almaraz
v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2010); Mei Ya Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1316,
1319 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Qi Hua Li v. Holder, 354 F. App’x. 46, 48 (5th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam); Wei v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 1248, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2008); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008); Zhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir.
2008); Cheng Chen v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 758, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2007).
128. See Rei Feng Wang v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 283, 879 (1st Cir. 2015).
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involves a mixed petition.129 Under the current circuit split, some
jurisdictions will allow a petitioner to bring a mixed petition for reopening
removal proceedings beyond the ninety-day limitation set by the statute,
since a sincere change in personal circumstances that occurs
simultaneously with changed country conditions should not bar foreclose
statutory protection.130 Other jurisdictions have held that if the country
conditions are only made relevant because of a change to the petitioner’s
personal circumstances, the country conditions exception should not
apply.131 Further, some courts of appeals have directly declined to answer
the question132 and others have indirectly “shown their cards.”133 The split
creates ambiguity in an area of law that needs no more, and as such a
resolution should be adopted by all of the Federal Courts of Appeals.
II. THE UNFORTUNATE FACTS: A HIGH QUANTITY OF LOW QUALITY
DECISIONS
In fiscal year 2013, the United States removed over 435,000 aliens
either through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) or the
United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.134 An
unfortunate result of these large amounts of removal proceedings is an
outpouring of individuals who are “former longtime legal residents whose
familial, cultural, and community ties lie primarily in the United
States.”135 Many of those removed for criminal convictions have been

129. Id. (stating the First Circuit need not and will not address which side of the circuit
split it will fall on regarding mixed petitions).
130. See Shu Han Liu v. Holder, 718 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f [petitioner’s]
conversion [to Christianity] was sincere . . . [was there no] basis . . . for treating her differently
from someone who had converted to Christianity before coming to the United States?”);
Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] petitioner’s untimely motion to
reopen may qualify under the changed conditions exception in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), even
if the changed country conditions are made relevant by a change in the petitioner’s personal
circumstances.”); Yu Yun Zhang 702 F.3d 878; Xue Xian Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d
1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009).
131. See Khan, 691 F.3d at 498 (“[W]here an alien intentionally alters his or her own
circumstances, knowing that he or she has been ordered removed from the United States, [the
exception] does not properly apply.”).
132. See Rei Feng Wang, 795 F.3d at 287 (“[W]e need not take a position on this and do
not decide whether rejecting a petition because it is mixed would be an abuse of discretion.”).
133. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“[A petitioner is not
allowed] to disregard their removal orders and remain in the United States long enough to
change their personal circumstances (e.g., by having children or practicing persecuted religion)
and initiate new proceedings via a new asylum application.”).
134. John F. Simanski, Immigration Enforcement Actions:2013, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
5
(Sept.
2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
135. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality,
Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 140 (2010).
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longtime residents of the United States and were removed for non-violent
criminal convictions.136 In fact, since the beginning of the Obama
administration, nearly two-thirds of those removed for criminal
convictions committed minor traffic violations, other minor infractions, or
had no criminal history at all.137
Compounding the sheer volume of removal orders is the fact that
many of these orders are poorly executed in a poorly administered appeal
process.138 First, the use of expedited proceedings without the opportunity
to appeal has increased every year since 2007.139 Second, even if the
petitioner is given the chance to appeal the immigration judge’s decision,
“Operation Streamline” has stripped administrative reliability for review.
Under this program, the BIA may now employ the use of single judge
“panels” to rubber stamp immigration judges’ decisions without a de novo
review of the facts with a bare, unexplained affirmance.140 The United
States government saw an opening and tried to force more individuals out
in a timely fashion; a Senate bill in 2014 attempted to triple the number of
daily deportees under “Operation Streamline” to 210 per day.141
A legal concern that affects this many individuals, in a matter that
disallows them the very meaning of justice, needs to be consistent and fair
to be just. Asking immigration judges to apply reliable and dependable
discretion in immigration proceedings is difficult enough given the
landscape of immigration courts, and the increased quantity of
proceedings under Operation Streamline, yet the Federal Courts of
Appeals have faltered in any attempt to resolve continuing discretion
under the landscape of motions to reopen removal proceedings.

136. See A Price Too High: US Families Torn Apart by Deportations for Drug Offenses,
HUM. RTS. WATCH at Part I. Background: US Deportation Policy for Immigrants with Criminal
Convictions (June 16, 2015), https://www hrw.org/report/2015/06/16/price-too-high/usfamilies-torn-apart-deportations-drug-offenses#page (finding between 1997 and 2007, seventytwo percent of those removed for criminal convictions were convicted of nonviolent offenses
and twenty percent were in the United States legally).
137.
Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor
Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2014),
http://www nytimes.com/2014/04/
07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows html?.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management,
Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002).
141. Joshua Partlow, Under Operation Streamline, Fast-Track Proceedings for Illegal
Immigrants, WASH. POST (February 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/under-operation-streamline-fast-track-proceedings-for-illegalimmigrants/2014/02/10/87529d24-919d-11e3-97d3-f7da321f6f33_story html.
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A. Operation Streamline and Other Concerns
Shuffle the masses in, read the charges to multiple individuals
(sometimes upwards of sixty)142 at a time, enter plea deals for less jail time
leading to deportation, rinse, repeat. Operation Streamline is the
“solution” provided for an already crowded immigration court docket.143
While not directly correlated to motions to reopen removal proceedings,
Operation Streamline is indicative of the public policy and current social
feelings towards immigration policy in the United States.144 Its
proponents often rely on the fact that those affected by Operation
Streamline are criminals. “You can say ‘these poor people’ and all this
other stuff, but they’re still criminals.”145 Statements like this miss the
true mark of what determines an immigrant’s criminal status, which in
many cases is attempting to enter the United States in the first place.146
An unfortunate side effect, among many, is that many defenses for
individuals—such as not being fit for trial, having a claim for citizenship,
or having a claim for asylum—are rarely brought up under Operation
Streamline.147
Statistically speaking, both sides have opinions on whether
Operation Streamline is even working. Supporters point to the decreased
number of detainees and arrests in the geographic areas that employ
Operation Streamline.148 Opponents, however, find flaws in these
statistics based on a decrease in border arrests by the Border Patrol and
Detention and Removal Operations across the board; the areas utilizing
operation streamline saw a decrease in arrests prior to Operation
Streamline even being used.149 In the political sphere, many liberals
oppose and many conservatives support Operation Streamline. President
142. Keller, supra note 114, at 127. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that such mass guilty
pleas violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. U.S. v. Roblero-Solis, 588
F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2009).
143. Partlow, supra note 141.
144. See id. (explaining the disconnect between those who strongly support immigration
reform to increase deportations and those who oppose).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Executive Office for United States Attorneys: Oversight Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. of Commercial and Admin, Law, 110th Cong. 10 (June 25, 2008) (amended written
statement of Heather E. Williams, First Assistant Fed. Public Defender Ariz.),
http://judiciary house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Williams080625.pdf. See also Keller, supra note
114, at 129 (“How, in minutes, can counsel determine if the client is a derivative U.S. citizen
and therefore innocent of the crimes to which the client is pleading guilty? Or whether the client
has a mental illness that prevents the knowing waiver of rights?”).
148. S. Res. 104, 114th Cong. (2015).
149. Williams, supra note 147, at 17 (citing Thomas Hillier, Statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
(April 22, 2008)).
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Barack Obama’s administration has recently made an effort to diminish
the effects of Operation Streamline,150 while United States Senators Jeff
Flake and John McCain have attempted to remove any policies that
prevent prosecution under Operation Streamline.151
As a result of “procedural shortcuts,” the number of illegal entry and
re-entry cases prosecuted by the federal government is nearly the same as
all other crimes combined.152 Regardless of the future political landscape
of Operation Streamline, a process of expediting removal proceedings is
imperative to a large group of individuals and erroneous to another.153 The
effect of this program is clear: individuals are deported at unprecedented
rates without proper proceedings and proper legal representation
protecting their rights.154 This leads to the deported individuals becoming
labeled as “criminals,” and when they attempt to re-enter the United
States, supporters of Operation Streamline will be able to point to this
classification of “criminal” as the reason we need to keep Operation
Streamline in place.155 The effect of Operation Streamline will ultimately
create a positive trend of facts and data showing the necessity of keeping
Operation Streamline in place; it is a self-perpetuating system.
B. Overturned: An All Too Common Phrase
Immigration orders are reviewable in the federal courts (most often
the Federal Courts of Appeals). Immigration reform faces another
substantial issue in the staggering number of deportation orders that are
subsequently reversed or overturned.156 “Federal courts . . . reverse
deportation orders at substantially higher rates than for other appeals.”157
In some circuits, the reversal rate for deportation orders is as high as
twenty to forty percent.158 One of the causes of this increasing number is
the BIA streamlining.159 After these new regulations regarding the BIA
that went into effect in 2005, the BIA increased its decisions from 2,000
150. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 781, 783–84 (2013) (discussing the Obama administration’s insistent “prosecutorial
discretion” toward immigration law in declining to enforce certain laws).
151. Senators Jeff Flake and John McCain introduced a Senate Resolution, which stated
the success of Operation Streamline and sought to force the Executive Branch to remove any
prohibition against Operation Streamline. S. Res. 104, 114th Cong. (2015).
152. Keller, supra note 114, at 129–30.
153. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 150, at 783–84; S. Res. 104, 114th Cong. (2015).
154. See Williams, supra note 147.
155. Keller, supra note 114, at 138.
156. Frankel, supra note 74, at 504–05.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 522.
159. See supra, Part II.A.
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per month to 4,000 per month.160 Further, “[t]he percentage of BIA
decisions in which it ruled against the alien . . . increased substantially,
from 75% in 2001, to 94–98% for the years 2002 through 2004.”161
Naturally, this leads to an increased number of petitions to the Federal
Courts of Appeals.162 This increase also resulted in a considerable rise in
the number of deportation orders that were reversed.
The orders have severe consequences of forcing an individual out of
a country they consider home. The orders are being brought so often that
they are now clogging up Federal Courts of Appeals, and yet the orders
are being reversed more often than any other crime. Yet discretion is left
in the hands of over-worked and under-trained individuals, such as
immigration judges and members of the BIA. Therefore, the Federal
Courts of Appeals need to properly instruct those courts in how to handle
every situation, including mixed petitions to reopen removal proceedings.
III. RESOLVING ISSUES WITH NON-DISCRETIONARY MEANS
The current landscape of immigration law includes immigration
judges that are over-worked and under-qualified.163
Yet, most
immigration proceedings involve at least some form of discretion, and
often complete discretion, on the part of the immigration judge.164 In order
to fix this broken system,165 underlying issues must be resolved first. One
of these is motions to reopen removal proceedings based on mixed
petitions. The Federal Courts of Appeals have not come to an agreement
on whether mixed petitions should consider the changed country
conditions exception to the ninety-day limitation.166 This disagreement
adds confusion and uncertainty to an already complex area of law that is
comprising individuals lacking the merit to uphold the law.167 This Note
will address this area of uncertainty by providing a non-discretionary
solution that can be applied in all cases where a petitioner seeks the
160. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 19–20 (2006–07).
161. Frankel, supra note 74, at 524.
162. Palmer, supra note 160, at 19–20.
163. See supra Part I.B (discussing the current workload of immigration judges and the
appointment process’ lack of experience in applicants and ultimate appointments).
164. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the proceedings overall, and specifically addressing
areas in which the Attorney General, through immigration judges, retains discretion in making
determinations).
165. As discussed in Part I. of the Note, the immigration system could use a complete
overhaul far beyond the scope of this Note, but this Note will not attempt to be a fix-all.
166. See Rei Feng Wang v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 283, 286–87 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that
the First Circuit need not take a position on the current circuit split regarding mixed petitions
since it could make its determination on other grounds).
167. See supra Part I.B.
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changed country condition exception to the ninety-day limitation while
bringing a mixed petition. In order to reach that succinct and narrow
solution, however this Note must address several preliminary issues to
bring the solution into context.
A. Miles Apart: The Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit . . . and the Sixth,
Seventh, Eleventh and Second Circuits, Too
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an abuse
of discretion occurs when the BIA’s decision to deny a motion to reopen
removal proceedings is “arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.”168
According to this circuit, a decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to
law” when a petitioner brings a motion to reopen removal proceedings
beyond the ninety-day statutory limit based on the changed country
conditions exception, and the BIA fails to consider those changed country
conditions.169
The government argued in Chandra that the petitioner failed to meet
the changed country conditions exception because his changed personal
circumstances are what made the changed country conditions relevant.170
The government and the BIA, in the lower proceeding, read the language
of Section 240 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to mean that the
only condition able to lift the ninety-day limitation is one of pure changed
country conditions.171 The appeals court took a more liberal approach to
the statute; “[t]he plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not
preclude an untimely motion where a change in the petitioner’s personal
circumstances is a necessary predicate to the success of the motion.”172
Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agrees
with its sister courts in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in
requiring the BIA to consider mixed petitions.173 The balancing test the

168. Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004).
169. Id.; Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2014).
170. Chandra, 751 F.3d at 1036.
171. Id. at 1035.
172. Id. at 1036. The change in personal circumstances cannot be the only reason for
bringing the untimely motion; it must be brought under a changed country condition that may
or may not be made relevant based on changed personal circumstances. See Najmabadi v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating a personal choice to become politically active
was a personal change not giving rise to the changed country condition exception).
173. See Shu Han Liu v. Holder, 718 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding “if her
conversion was sincere, [there was no] basis . . . for treating her differently from someone who
had converted to Christianity before coming to the United States[.]”); Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder,
702 F.3d 878, 879–80 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that “separate but simultaneous changes
distinguish the[] facts from a purely personal change in circumstances.”); Jiang v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding the BIA wrongly concluded that the
petition was brought because of the birth of children, changed personal circumstances, instead
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Court applied is one between immigrants changing personal
circumstances to serve their self-interest and the right of an individual
freely to choose whatever religion the individual would like to practice.174
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took a much
different approach regarding mixed petitions, opining that if allowed to
bring mixed petition motions to reopen removal proceedings, petitioners
will abuse the system.175 Further, it appears the court intended to prevent
individuals who remain in the United States after being ordered removed
another chance at succeeding in remaining in the country.176 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seems to apply the same
approach.177
The disconnect between the Federal Courts of Appeals lies in the
divide between the two principles of immigration: letting “good” people
in, and keeping “bad” people out. Courts that allow mixed petitions likely
base their decision on a notion that no individual should be forced to return
to a country wherein that individual will face some form of persecution.178
The petitioners may change their personal circumstances to meet the
changed country condition exception, but that is a large risk with little
guarantee.
On the other hand, the courts that are against mixed petitions may be
persuaded by the fact that allowing such would lead to stalling on the part
of the petitioner. Motions to reopen are disfavored because “every delay
works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to
remain in the United States.”179 The solution posited by this Note is to
create a test that removes some of the discretion from the immigration
judge and BIA.
If a petitioner brings a motion to reopen removal proceedings beyond
the ninety-day statutory limitation, based on both changes in personal
circumstances and changed country conditions, the immigration court
should apply a test to determine whether the individual meets the
exception. Providing immigration courts with a concrete set of rules to

of the increase in a one-child policy, changed country conditions).
174. Chandra, 751 F.3d at 1039.
175. See Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 691 F.3d 488, 498 (3d Cir. 2012) (“where an alien
intentionally alters his or her own circumstances, knowing that he or she has been ordered
removed from the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) does not properly apply.”).
176. Li Zhang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 543 F. App’x. 277, 285 (3d Cir. 2013).
177. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (“to disregard their
removal orders and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal
circumstances (e.g., by having children or practicing a persecuted religion) and initiate new
proceedings via a new asylum application” is not permitted).
178. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2016).
179. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).
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utilize in decision-making will benefit an over-worked system as strained
as the immigration courts.180 This way, an abuse of discretion is easier to
determine by examining whether the immigration judge or BIA
sufficiently applied the test.
B. The Standard of Review for Denial of Motions to Reopen Removal
Proceedings Creates Ambiguity that Must Be Resolved by a Test
The federal judiciary applies an abuse of discretion standard to
determine whether the BIA correctly concluded a motion to reopen
removal proceedings.181 This standard balances the interest in finality
with fairness.182 While administrative agencies, such as the BIA, are
envisioned as competent adjudicators in a specific and limited area of law,
judicial review brings independence to the administrative process.183 A
federal judge has more general knowledge of all things legal, and many
removal and asylum cases are in fact questions of law and fact, not
discretion.184
In cases that involve something as important, vital, and potentially
catastrophic as deportation, the interests in judicial fairness are
paramount.185 “Our legal system can tolerate occasional unfairness when
the stakes are trivial, but claims that affect truly significant interests
demand a more meticulous brand of justice.”186 Immigration proceedings,
because of the complexity of the laws at issue and the grand nature of what
is at stake, require legal assistance in a way most administrative
proceedings do not.187
180. See supra Part II.
181. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314. This standard of review provides more discretion to the
BIA than the standard used when the BIA denies an asylum claim at an original hearing. See
Hugh G. Mullane, Political Asylum: Determining Standards of Review, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 87,
100 (1992).
182. See Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (holding motions to reopen are disfavored in the interest
of finality since every extension works to the advantage of the alien seeking to not be removed);
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108 (1987) (“If INS discretion is to mean anything, it must be that
the INS has some latitude in deciding when to reopen a case. The INS should have the right to
be restrictive. Granting such motions too freely will permit endless delay of deportation by
aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.”) (citation omitted); Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and
the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1215–16 (1989) [hereinafter Political
Asylum] (“The concern has been that motions to reopen permit an endless string of procedural
maneuvers calculated only to stall removal.”).
183. Political Asylum, supra note 182, at 1209.
184. Id. at 1208–10. The immigration judges are also constantly presented situations
involving human hardship, creating a tough skin to human suffering, so to speak, that federal
judges will not have fostered. Id. at 1210.
185. Id. at 1209.
186. Id.
187. Davis, supra note 22, at 140.
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Additionally, individuals in removal proceedings typically lack
access and information regarding legal avenues of response, thus
increasing an already-important component in light of the fact that an
incorrect move procedurally has such high ramifications.188
Noncitizens may attend the most important adversarial proceeding of
their lives with little understanding of what is required of them to
avoid removal. In some areas of the country, overwhelming dockets
result in chaotic proceedings in which undocumented persons must
show—sometimes in fifteen minutes or less—why they should not be
removed from the United States.189

Because of this lack of access and political independent power, aliens
and individuals seeking asylum or facing removal orders need the
judiciary for protection of rights, both basic and complex in nature.190
Also, an individual removed by order without a fair and just trial,
adjudicated on the merits of the case and equally assessed when compared
with other similarly situated individuals, will undoubtedly bring
resentment toward the American system home.191 This leads to animosity
in the rest of the world toward American immigration policies.192
Beyond the reasons above for broad judicial review is the overarching notion that immigration judges could draft properly-reasoned
decisions knowing that an “active” federal judiciary would review the
decision.193 The federal court would apply its generalist knowledge of law
to the present facts and statutes to independently determine whether the
immigration tribunal came to the correct conclusion.194 This interest loses
all power and application if the federal courts have not resolved whether
to allow a certain type of motion to reopen. An immigration judge, in
drafting a decision regarding a mixed petition, may abuse his or her
discretion inadvertently because the federal courts have not come to a
consistent conclusion on whether such a petition should be allowed.
Therefore, it is necessary to remove ambiguity in these cases, and create
a test the judge should use in determining when a mixed petition brought
188. See Legomsky, supra note 182, at 1208 (explaining that aliens are “politically
powerless” and “[u]nable to vote or hold office”); see also Rosberg, Aliens and Equal
Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977) (explaining the inability
of aliens to vote in an historical context and arguments for those rights).
189. Davis, supra note 22, at 137.
190. Legomsky, supra note 182, at 1208.
191. See id. at 1210 (“The unsuccessful asylum applicant who perceives procedural
unfairness will bring that message home. Our treatment of aliens can shape foreign impressions
of the American justice system.”).
192. See id.
193. Id. at 1210–11.
194. Id. at 1211.
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beyond the ninety-day statutory limit will be addressed and when the
petition fails procedurally.
C. A Test Addressing Specific Rules that Must be Met in Order for
Mixed Petitions to be Brought under the Changed Country
Conditions Exception Will Create Uniformity in an Area of Law that
Desperately Needs It
First, this Section discusses why a set of standards would not suffice
in an area of law with factual discrepancies. Then, it examines why a set
of rules, hard and bright-line procedures, would benefit immigration
judges, the BIA, and the aliens who are petitioning for reopening removal
proceedings.
The distinction between standards and rules is engraved in every law
students’ mind, whether directly or indirectly, from the reading of their
first case in law school. While not easily defined, rules and standards
operate on opposite ends of a scale or continuum.195 A prime example of
a rule is as follows: “Any driver who travels on a highway at faster than
fifty-five miles per hour commits the offense of speeding.”196 A judge
determining whether an individual has violated the rule of law of speeding
need not inquire into any facts beyond what would prove the rule broken,
that the driver was operating a motor vehicle at a speed faster than fiftyfive miles per hour on a highway.197
Indeed, a standard could be used instead to determine the offense of
speeding. For example, “[a]ny driver who travels unreasonably fast,
considering road conditions and traffic patterns, commits the offense of
speeding.”198 Here, the judge has a more discretionary approach to take
in determining whether an offense of speeding has occurred; the judge
must first determine what is reasonable, and then move on to the analysis
of whether this driver was within that range.199
The trade-off is readily apparent: rules create predictable and
uniform decisions at the cost of over- and under-inclusiveness.200
Standards allow judges to make case-by-case determinations and
modifications but do so in a way that leads to unpredictable results and

195. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 561–62 (1992).
196. Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 559, 562 (2010) (citing Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules
vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000)).
197. Id. at 562.
198. Id. at 563 (citing Korobkin, supra note 196).
199. Id.
200. See id.; Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 402 (1985).
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unfair treatment of potentially similar fact patterns.201
Indeed, in a legal situation where facts are so important, like the ones
described in the Introduction to this Note,202 standards would be
ineffective. In the same way as the judges discussed in the Introduction
came to differing views regarding whether to allow mixed petitions, so
too could judges come to different views regarding a standard such as, if
the alien was reasonable in changing their personal circumstances, a
mixed petition based on material changed country conditions is
allowed.203 Further, discretion is already found in the immigration judge’s
decision of whether or not to allow a petitioner to bring a motion to reopen
their removal proceedings.204 A Federal Court of Appeals, when
reviewing a decision by the BIA or an immigration judge, is simply
looking for an abuse of discretion.205 By adding more discretion to the
process without resolving the actual issue of non-uniformity, the test
would merely create a murky situation.
Finally, under an economic analysis, courts must move towards
whichever form of a test promotes efficiency.206 Further, there is a costbenefit tradeoff between rules and standards regarding the quantity of
application: the more often a test will be applied, the more beneficial the
costlier rule will be.207 As illegal re-entry and removal proceedings
continue to top the list of prosecuted crimes in the United States,208 it is
becoming clearer that immigration courts should adopt a set of rules for
determining whether an alien is allowed to reopen their removal
proceedings based on changes to both their personal circumstances and
country conditions should be allowed.209
D. The Burden Shift Proposal
The primary role of this test is to decrease discretion of judges in

201. Morse, supra note 196, at 563.
202. See supra Introduction.
203. See Li Zhang v. Att’y Gen., 543 F. App’x. 277 (3rd Cir. 2013); Chandra v. Holder,
751 F.3d 1034, 1035 (9th Cir. 2014).
204. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2016).
205. See Rei Feng Wang v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 2015) (“We review the
BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.”); I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314
(1992).
206. Morse, supra note 196, at 567.
207. Kaplow, supra note 195, at 563–64.
208. See Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRANSACTIONAL RECS.
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/; see
also Frankel, supra note 74, at 503.
209. See Morse, supra note 196, at 567 (“[B]ecause the development of a rule is more
costly than a standard but the application of a standard is more costly than the application of a
rule, the frequency of application affects the choice of forms.”).
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order to alleviate unjust results without providing a loophole for
individuals that do not meet the changed country condition exception. In
order to create a balance between the two, a burden shift will be utilized.
Similar to the inherent difficulties found in proving employment
discrimination,210 proving a person changed some circumstance of their
life for reasons other than a potential removal proceeding will be difficult.
As a trade-off, the burden shift could be used to lessen the unbalance these
difficulties provide.211
In a mixed petition to reopen, the government would argue the
changed personal circumstances of the petitioner are the reason the
changed country conditions apply, and thus should be barred.212 This
would shift the burden to the petitioner who would need to fulfill the test
as described below213 and thus show the changed personal circumstances
should not prevent a changed country condition exception from
applying.214 The burden would then shift one final time back to the
government to show that the changes in personal circumstances were in
fact only made to meet the changed country condition exception, and, as
a matter of policy, should not apply.215
E. Determinative Factors to Resolve the Circuit Split
Since a test is intended to remove some of the discretion from an
under-trained and over-worked court system, it must be succinct.216

210. See Barrett S. Moore, Shifting the Burden: Genuine Disputes and Employment
Discrimination Standards of Proof, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 113, 114 (2012).
211. Id.
212. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2016). The statute
does not explicitly show this burden to exist. The burden can be implied from the fact that no
courts allow a change in personal circumstances to provide the same exception allowed for
changed country conditions. See, e.g., Ming Chen v. Holder, 722 F.3d 63, 66–67 (1st Cir. 2013);
Xiu Zhen Zheng v. Holder, 548 F. App’x. 869, 870 (4th Cir. 2013); Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder,
702 F.3d 878, 879–80 (6th Cir. 2012); Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 497–98 (3d Cir. 2012);
Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2010); Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1316,
1319 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Qi Hua Li v. Holder, 354 F. App’x. 46, 48 (5th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam); Wei v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 1248, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2008); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008); Zhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir.
2008); Cheng Chen v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2007). As a result, the government
carries the initial burden of proving the exception to the ninety-day and one motion statutory
limit on reopening removal proceedings should not apply.
213. See infra Part III.E.
214. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2016).
215. See Hang Chen v. Holder, 675 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Courts disfavor
motions to reopen removal proceedings because they run the risk of frustrating the compelling
public interests in finality and the expeditious processing of proceedings.”). See also INS v.
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“[A]s a general matter, every delay works to the advantage
of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.”).
216. See supra Part II.
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“While the BIA has substantial discretion to grant or deny motions that
fulfill . . . basic prerequisites [set by INS regulations or BIA precedent], it
is without discretion, when it deals with motions made by the parties, to
ignore existing regulatory requirements.”217 Succinctness, while it may
lead to under-inclusiveness as addressed previously,218 will provide a
better landscape for practitioners and aliens alike.
Finally, the test should not lose sight of the fact that the ninety-day
statutory limit is in place for a reason, and therefore any expansion on the
changed country condition exception must do its best to prevent the
possibility of aliens bringing motions to reopen simply to keep their case
alive in order to remain in the country.219 Similar to the reason motions
to rehear a trial are disfavored, immigration proceedings carry the same
fears, only more apparent, “where . . . every delay works to the advantage
of the deportable alien.”220 For that reason, the test should include
determinative factors to guide the immigration judge’s decision in a
predictable way that fulfills the need of finality in removal proceedings,221
but also reaches a decision on mixed petitions that does not discriminate
against the aliens bringing such motions.222
1.

The First Determinative Factor: Voluntariness

In order to meet the purpose of the statute223 without providing an
indirect road to faux-permanent non-resident status via consistent motion
practice, the first determinative factor involves voluntariness when
bringing mixed petitions to reopen removal proceedings. For an act to be
voluntary, it must be done or given by choice, in other words, because
someone wanted to and not because they were forced to.224 Voluntary acts
are “[d]one by design or intention” while voluntary statements are
“[u]nconstrained by interference [or] not impelled by outside

217. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2004).
218. See supra Part III.C.
219. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (discussing, prior to the introduction
of the time and number bar currently on motions to reopen removal proceedings, that there were
at least three grounds the BIA could deny a motion to reopen based on the substance of the
motion: “failure to establish a prima facie case,” “failure to introduce previously unavailable,
material evidence,” or “the movant would not to the discretionary grant of relief.”).
220. Id.
221. See Hang Chen v. Holder, 675 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2012).
222. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(5)–(7) (2016) (providing Congress’s policy on
persecution of individuals based on the religious freedom an individual should have); 22 U.S.C.
§ 6401(b)(5) (2016) (stating that the policy of the United States is to stand with the persecuted).
223. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)
(2016).
224. Voluntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
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influence.”225 Of course, definitions in the legal world are often more
convoluted than those applied in the realm of literature.226 While the term
“voluntary” does not appear in the definitions section of the Immigration
and Nationality Act,227 it does appear in later sections dealing with loss of
nationality.228 In order for an individual to lose his or her nationality in
the United States, they must do one of the enumerated items within the
section “with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality.”229
The application within the context of utilization should define the
term voluntary. For example, the test proposed in this Note applies the
term voluntary as: any mixed petition brought by a petitioner, wherein the
changed personal circumstances were not voluntarily changed by the
petitioner, shall be allowed the changed country conditions exception to
the ninety-day limit.
Therefore, the definition used by the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary above is satisfactory. This regulatory addition to prevent
mixed petitions gives the petitioner more time in the country. If the
petitioner’s changed personal circumstances caused an applicable
changed country condition exception without the petitioner’s intent, there
is no intent to circumvent the ninety-day statutory limit on motions to
reopen removal proceedings.
To better portray the first prong of the test, consider the following
two examples. First, suppose a woman was ordered removed from the
United States to a province in China that recently began to persecute
individuals for having more than one child after the United States ordered
her removed.230 If someone forced this alien into pregnancy via rape, her
personal circumstances involuntarily changed. Similarly, consider a male
who ordered removed from the United States to a country that now
persecutes individuals for homosexuality. When this individual entered
the United States, he believed he was heterosexual, but has since
discovered he is attracted to individuals of the same sex.231 This would
again be an involuntary change in personal circumstances.
225. Voluntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
226. See, e.g., Raina Nortick, Note, Singled Out: A Proposal to Extend Asylum to the
Unmarried Partners of Chinese Nationals Fleeing the One-Child Policy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2153, 2161 (2007) (explaining the Chinese government can use psychological means to
convince a woman not to have a second child, but as long as the ultimate steps to a clinic to
abort the child are done under the women’s own will, the entire decision is voluntary).
227. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. 1101 (2016).
228. Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. 1481 (2016).
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. See, e.g., Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009).
231. This Note is not the place to argue whether an individual is born homosexual or
becomes homosexual. The example provided merely shows application of the above prong of
the test.
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The Second Determinative Factor: Necessity

The second determinative test involves whether the petitioner
changed personal circumstances out of necessity. While this may create
some discretion in the immigration judge’s decision, a well-defined term
provides a greater probability of fair and uniform decision-making.
Something is of necessity when it is “in such a way that it cannot be
otherwise”232 or “[t]hat is needed for some purpose or reason;
essential.”233 This definition is not nearly as clear-cut as the one provided
for voluntary and needs clarification to achieve uniformity. Again, putting
the word into the context of the proposed rule: a petitioner whose personal
circumstances changed only out of necessity for the safety of themselves
or a family member, should be allowed the changed country conditions
exception. Further, the subsection under which one finds motions to
reopen removal proceedings lends some assistance.234 The subsection
titled asylum removes the ninety-day limitation for individuals bringing
such a motion under Section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.235 Therefore, a petitioner changed personal circumstances out of
necessity if the petitioner acted solely to prevent harm to themselves or a
member of their immediate family.
3.

Applying the Test to Li Zhang

Li Zhang was the alien in the introduction who was deported and not
allowed to move to reopen her removal proceedings. To exemplify the
test we will use her case. First, Li Zhang would propose that her mixed
petition should allow her to reopen removal proceedings based on her
changed country condition. The government would argue that it was she
that changed the personal circumstances (in her case, religion) and as a
result the exception does not apply. If Li Zhang can bring forth reliable
evidence that shows her changes were not made in an effort to stay in the
country, but were legitimate changes she made (like the fact that her
family was Catholic, her husband had already converted while in China,
and her children were now converted), the court should allow her mixed
petition to fall under the changed country conditions exception.
CONCLUSION
The immigration courts have proved through the surge of cases they
hear that some of their discretion may not be in the interest of its assigned
232.
233.
234.
(2016).
235.

Necessity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
Necessary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)
Id.
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statutes. Recent reports state immigration judges may be under-qualified
for the positions they hold.236 Further, the task of hearing more cases than
any other type of judge in the United States over-burdens them.237 As the
number of cases heard by a set of immigration judges rose, so too did the
number of cases heard by and reversed or overturned by the Federal
Courts. One area wherein this is readily apparent involves petitions to
reopen removal proceedings based on changed circumstances.
Without a test to determine when to allow mixed petitions to reopen
removal proceedings, the immigration courts have full discretion to
determine whether or not an individual may bring a claim under the
changed country conditions exception to the ninety-day statutory limit on
motions to reopen removal proceedings. Even the Federal Courts of
Appeals are unable to come to a uniform decision, and they are not nearly
as overburdened by an extensively large docket. Therefore, a test that asks
whether the petitioner’s change in personal circumstances was voluntary
and necessary will provide the immigration judges with a uniform rule for
deciding these types of motions.

236.
237.

Liptak, supra note 14.
Noferi, supra note 21.

